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Abstract
Among the phenomena in economics that are not yet
well-understood is the fat-tailed (power-law) distribution of firm sizes
in the world’s economies. Different mechanisms suggested in the
literature to explain this distribution of firm sizes are discussed in
the present paper. The paper uses the China Industrial Enterprises
Database to study the distribution (firm size in terms of the number
of employees, capital, and gross profit) for the provinces of China
for the years 1998-2008. We estimate the power-law distribution
and confirm its plausibility using the KS test and the log-likelihood
ratio vs. lognormal and exponential distributions. The analysis on
regional levels allows an assessment of regional effects on differences
in the distribution; we discuss possible explanations for the observed
patterns in the light of the recent regional economic development in
the PRC.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of firm sizes in the world’s economies seems to be remark-
ably homogeneous and stable across different countries as well as across time.
It has been characterized as fat tailed, specifically as following a power law in
the tail by different studies for different regions (e.g. the US (Axtell (2001)),
the G7 countries (Gaffeo et al. (2003)), or China (Zhang et al. (2009))).
Other studies Marsili (2005), Bottazzi et al. (2007), Dinlersoz and MacDon-
ald (2009) found that the distribution only holds on an aggregate level across
either sectors or firms of different ages - which may imply an evolutionary
process or a self-organized criticality system depending on typical life-cycle
developments of firms.1 A consensus has not yet emerged and no generally
accepted theory of how the distribution emerges has been found. There are,
however, a number of candidate explanations as will be detailed in section 2
below - an ongoing debate to which the present study will contribute as well.
While differences in the shape and parameters of the distribution have been
investigated for sectors (Marsili (2005), Bottazzi and Secchi (2006), Bottazzi
et al. (2007)) and international comparisons exist as well (Okuyama et al.
(1999), Gaffeo et al. (2003)) there are to our knowledge no studies of regional
differences within a country. While international differences also reflect dif-
ferences in political systems and culture, regional variation may highlight
what actually governs the emergence of the power law distribution and its
particular shape. Of course this is also true for sectoral disaggregation, which
has, however, already been studied extensively (Marsili (2005), Bottazzi et al.
(2007), Bottazzi and Secchi (2006), Dosi (2007), Dosi et al. (2015)). This is
related to the question of the very existence and persistence of diversity in
economic firms and firm sizes (moreover in exactly this pattern), a question
that also seems to require explanations related to evolutionary economics and
self-organization (Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi et al. (1995), Kwas´nicki
(1998), Bottazzi and Secchi (2006)).
We use the People’s Republic of China’s China Industrial Enterprises
Database to analyze this distribution (the firm size in terms of 1) the
number of employees, 2) capital, and 3) gross profit ) for China for the
years 1998 through 2008 both for the country as a whole and for individual
provinces in section 4. It is attempted to model the distribution as a power
law - a hypothesis that is supported by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
measure 1 (number of employees), as well as for some regions for measures
2 and 3 - following the well-established methods laid out in, e.g. Clauset
et al. (2009) or Maschberger and Kroupa (2009). The analysis on regional
(i.e. province level) and sectoral levels allows us to assess differences in the
distribution and their relation to the respective industry dynamics and
regional specifics.
1This idea was earlier proposed by Dosi et al. (1995).
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As firm size distributions are likely affected by - besides other factors - eco-
nomic policy and development, we devote section 3 to this aspect. The
section covers the historical development of the People’s Republic of China,
its economic policy since the 1980s, and how this may have impacted the dis-
tribution of the firm size differently across different provinces and in compar-
ison to other countries. Specifically, reforms and economic opening towards
a market economy in the 1980s and 1990s led to a very different development
of different regions regarding their distinctive industrial profile, geographic
advantages, and cultural properties. It may also have provided incentive
for some regions to obtain and utilize first mover advantages and to cre-
ate growth opportunities for other regions. A number of coastal cities and
provinces were selected as the first special economic zones to be opened to
the global market in 1980s, whereas the Western and Central areas did not
benefit directly from the reforms until the late 1990s. This makes the re-
gional firm size distribution in China a historically unique example the study
of which may help in understanding the processes behind the astounding
properties and similarities of firm size distributions in economies around the
world.
Section 2 discusses the literature on firm size distribution with particular
emphasis on the possible origins of the power law shape. This is followed
by considerations on recent economic history in China in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 proceeds with the empirical analysis and results for which potential
explanations are introduced in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
It had first been hypothesized by Zipf and shortly afterwards empirically
substantiated by Mandelbrot and Simon2 that firm sizes follow power law
distributions, that is sizes s occur with frequency
p(s) = Cs−α P (s > s∗) =
C
α− 1s
−α+1.
In fact, it was conjectured with reasonable empirical evidence, that they
specifically follow the Zipf distribution with exponent α = 2.
A number of theories have been put forward, why this might be the case
(both, that the measure is power law distributed, if the second conjecture is
accepted, that the exponent is α = 2). Notable theories include:
1. A Gibrat process, a scale-invariant growth process which converges
(fast enough) to a steady state distribution, will yield a power law
2For a short historical overview, see Buend´ıa (2013); for a comprehensive early theo-
retical account, see Ijiri and Simon (1977).
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with exponent α = 2. Further, processes with almost any growth rate
distribution will lead to a distribution converging to a power law as long
as there is a lower bound to the distribution (Kesten process) (Gabaix
(1999), Axtell (2001), Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Luttmer (2007)); see
also item 4.
2. Exponentially mixed Gaussians, that is, lognormal distributions mixed
with exponentials lead to power laws under certain conditions. The
lognormal distribution can for instance be given by a normally dis-
tributed growth rate, the exponential distribution can be assumed for
other measures, such as the firm age (Coad (2010)) or the firm’s prod-
uct diversity (Buldyrev et al. (2007)).
3. Aggregation over not power law distributed sectoral firm sizes as sug-
gested by Dosi et al. (1995), Dosi (2007). The Bose-Einstein statistic,
first suggested by Ijiri and Simon (1977) has been proposed as the
distribution of growth opportunities that are subject to increasing re-
turns following a generalized Eggenberger-Po´lya-urn process and that
result in Subbotin distributed (ideally, for the infinite limit Laplace
distributed) firm growth rates (Bottazzi and Secchi (2006)).3
4. Multiplicative stochastic processes can give rise to power laws, the sim-
plest such case being an AK model with A being drawn from a uniform
distribution with nonzero mean (e.g. Zhang et al. (2009)).
5. The power law property is introduced through another variable and
retained in the firm size. The variable often suspected to potentially
act in this way is the productivity distribution across firms. A revenue
function which is exponential in the productivity with a positive expo-
nent with an absolute value smaller than the productivity distribution’s
power law exponent will then yield another power law for the revenue
distribution (Helpman et al. (2004)).
6. Preferential attachment in networks yields degree distributions that
follow power laws. If the economy is modeled as a network where the
firm size depends on the degree of the node (firm) and has a positive
influence on further increase of that degree, the power law is retained
in the firm size distribution (Stephen and Toubia (2009), Dahui et al.
(2006)).
3It should be noted that exponential (in this theory Laplacian) growth rates should
sum up to sizes that are Gamma distributed, not power law. There is limited evidence for
sectoral size distributions that do not match the power law shape (Marsili (2005), Bottazzi
et al. (2007)). In spite of overwhelming evidence for power law figures in the aggregated
distributions, it has further been noted that scale free power law distributions should be
persistent under disaggregation (Dosi et al. (2015)) which may cast doubt on whether the
true distribution indeed follows a power law.
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7. Other processes involving self-organized criticality (in a similar way
to Gibrat and Kesten processes) could as well be used to model the
emergence of power laws (Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Battiston et al.
(2007)).
More recently, some scholars doubt the nature of the firm size distribution as
a power law. Since its emergence is not well-understood, it is possible that the
firm size actually follows an unidentified distribution similar to but different
from a power law. As long as good fits can be obtained for a power law over
several orders of magnitude, however, the interpretation of the parameters
would remain largely unchanged; the assessment of some properties of the
theoretical distribution (likelihood of ’black swans’, extreme tail observations,
existence of moments, convergence with increasing sample size) may change.
Empirical power law fits of the firm size distribution generally yield power
law exponents around α = 2; the specific values reported in the literature are
summarized in table 1. There is evidence for some variation across sectors,
countries, and time. However, very few scholars interpret these variations
as actually meaningful. Notably, Gaffeo et al. (2003) have proposed and
provided evidence for falling exponents during recessions. The literature
tradition following Helpman et al. (2004) has attempted to establish that
exponents firms differ between samples of exporting and non-exporting firms
(di Giovanni et al. (2011), Sun and Zhang (2012)).
Further, there are indications that different measures of firm sizes yield
slightly different exponents (see table 1). The exponent for sales is reported
to be slightly lower than that for capital by Gaffeo et al. (2003) (but for some
cases slightly higher in Fujimoto et al. (2011)). The exponent for the distri-
bution in the number of employees is for many countries (including China)
reported to be higher than that for either sales or capital in Fujimoto et al.
(2011).4
While the firm size distribution is generally stable across time and geographic
region, some differences have been reported; of interest for the present study
are those that directly concern China. Both Duschl and Peng (2015) and
Yu et al. (2015) recently found that the characteristics of Chinese firms vary
greatly with the ownership structure. Duschl and Peng (2015) report lower
average growth for state-owned enterprises but a much higher probability to
become high growth firms while foreign owned enterprises are also more likely
to show high growth rates. Yu et al. (2015) indicate larger shifts in the pro-
ductivity distribution in the 1990s and 2000s resulting from exit and changes
in ownership and organizational structure. Other aspects seem unique for
China as well: the variance scaling relationship (inverse linear relationship
4For disaggregated (sectoral) data (Bottazzi et al. (2007)) even report some cases of
different modality for different firm size measures.
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Author(s) Com. CDF
Exponent
PDF Expo-
nent
Measure Data
Okuyama et al.
(1999)
0.72-1.4 1.72-2.4 income USA, Japan 1990s
Axtell (2001) 0.994-1.0039 1.994-2.0039 employees USA 1988-1997
Gaffeo et al. (2003) 0.81-0.97 1.81-1.97 sales CAN, USA, JAP,
ITA, FRA, GER,
UK
1.04-1.328 2.04-2.328 capital
0.73-0.84 1.73-1.84 debt
Silverberg and
Verspagen (2007)
1.0 2.0 innovation
(patent)
revenue
USA, Europe
Helpman et al.
(2004)
0.4-1.8 1.4-2.8 sales Europe by sectors
1997
Zhang et al. (2009) 0.937-1.013 1.937-2.013 revenues Top 500 firms,
China 2002-2007
di Giovanni et al.
(2011)
0.949-1.111 1.949-2.111 employees France
0.362-1.663 1.362-2.663 sales
Fujimoto et al.
(2011)
0.6315-1.2056 1.6315-2.2056 capital worldwide
0.8234-1.6516 1.8234-2.6516 employees
0.7241-1.3103 1.7241-2.3103 sales
0.867 1.867 capital China
1.2881 2.2881 employees
0.9972 1.9972 sales
Sun and Zhang
(2012)
0.411-0.81 1.411-1.81 sales China by sectors
1998-2007
Buend´ıa (2013) 1.096-1.328 2.096-2.328 market share Telecom. and
Aerospace sector,
USA
Table 1: Power law exponent estimates for firm size from the literature.
of the variance of growth rates and the logarithm of the size) differs from
Western economies (the parameter being smaller) according to Duschl and
Peng (2015) while Yu et al. (2015) report a very stable productivity growth
distribution on the aggregated level compared to other emerging economies.
A related problem is the very existence and persistence of diversity in eco-
nomic firms (moreover in exactly this pattern). Among the approaches
put forward in relation to this question those from evolutionary economics
(Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi et al. (1995), Kwas´nicki (1998), Bottazzi
and Secchi (2006), Dinlersoz and MacDonald (2009)), for a comprehensive
overview, see e.g. Kwas´nicki (1998), more recent advances are discussed in,
e.g. (Schwardt and Schwesinger (2013), Dosi et al. (2015)) seem to be the
most promising. Several explanations have been put forward; most obvi-
ously, firms compete with different degree of success especially with respect
to processes that are subject to uncertainty such as innovation and research.
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In fact, this is the core of the earliest Schumpeterian agent-based models
of economic change (Nelson and Winter (1982)). More recent approaches
emphasize that there may be a general mechanism that breaks the symme-
try of the underlying growth and contraction process. Increasing returns
(network externalities, for instance) lead to advantages for established com-
petitors with large user bases for their products - which is arguably particu-
larly important in modern ICTs (Arthur (1996), Bottazzi and Secchi (2006),
Heinrich (2013, 2014), Buend´ıa (2013)). An alternative approach is that in
the presence of different (substitutable) input factors, firm types with differ-
ent factor utilization (productivity) profiles will obtain different sustainable
market shares (i.e., in the steady state) (Schwardt and Schwesinger (2013)).
3 Recent Economic Policy and Development
in the PRC
Before we proceed with the empirical analysis and the evaluation of poten-
tial explanations in sections 4 and 5, we discuss three aspects of the recent
economic history of China: the gradual opening to market economy (which
happened at different times for different regions), the reform of state-owned
enterprises, and the rise and fall of (also state-owned, but more decentral-
ized) township and village enterprises. All of these and other aspects that
we will merely touch upon likely have a strong impact on the current dis-
tribution of firm sizes in China. China is unique in that its transition to
the market economy occurred stepwise, thus creating considerable regional
variety, particularly between coastal, Central, and Western provinces, as well
as resource-based provincial economies as is the case in Inner Mongolia. The
differences can most clearly be seen in figure 16 which shows the median
firm age in 20085: low in Inner Mongolia and in the Central provinces (that
had recently completed their market economy transition reforms), higher in
coastal regions (that completed the transition less recently) and especially in
the Western part of the country (where the transition was just under way).
As the pattern is clearly visible in the age distribution of firms, an effect on
the size distribution should clearly be expected.
3.1 China’s Opening to the Market Economy
In 1979, the central government started to reduce some restrictions on in-
ternational trade, and offered special priorities to Guandong and Fujian
provinces. One year later, four cities, which are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou
in Gongdong, and Xiamen in Fujian, were established as special economic
5Computed from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database also used in section 4.
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zones, aiming at attracting international investment and building capabilities
in international trade.
Inspired by the success of the special economic zones, the government
decided to add more coastal cities as coastal open cities (14 cities), namely
Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian (Liaoning province), Qinhuangdao (Hebei),
Yantai (Shandong), Qingdao (Shandong), Lianyungang (Jiangsu), Nantong
(Jiangsu), Ningbo (Zhejiang), Wenzhou (Zhejiang), Fuzhou (Fujian),
Guangzhou (Guangdong), Zhanjiang (Guangdong), Beihai (Guangxi), in
1984. At almost the same time, the government set up the Yangtze River
Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Minnan Delta (roughly geographically
equivalent to Fujian province) as economic open zones. Together with the
Bohai Bay Economic Rim set up as a special economic zone in 1988, all the
economic open zones which account for 20% population of China, provided
a tremendous increase in the volume of China’s international trade.
In 1988, the central government decided to organize Hainan Island, which
had been part of Guangdong Province until then, into a separate province
and declare it an economic open zone.
After 1992, the central government clearly announced that China would es-
tablish a market economy system, so such kinds of economic open zones
would become very common while China would become more open to and
increasingly interconnected to the global market.
Looking at the development of the TVEs in China, most TVEs were located
in or focused on the opening economic zones, and provided products and
services to the export sectors.
3.2 State-Owned Enterprise Reform
Since 1979, the Chinese government has also implemented a series of reforms
in state-owned enterprises. Within the time frame considered in the em-
pirical study in this paper, more than 90% of the state-owned enterprises
were either privatized or discontinued (many went bankrupt). This might
have had significant effects on the distribution of sizes, numbers, and ages of
firms. Besides that, due to the asymmetric distribution of the discontinued
state-owned enterprises and the emerging private enterprises, the regional
distribution of firms also may have changed between 1998 and 2008. For ex-
ample, after the reform of state-owned enterprises only the Eastern (coastal)
provinces developed the private economy intensively. Currently, most state-
owned enterprises are active in monopoly industries considered as vital and
strategic sectors in terms of national security, for example, electricity, oil,
natural resource, defense, etc. Moreover, the state-owned enterprises are of-
ten comparatively large and are not included in the database we used. For
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example, the Fortune 500 in 2014 listed 100 Chinese firms, but 92 of 100 those
firms were state-owned enterprises. Therefore, calculating size distributions
of firms (in terms of capital) including these large state-owned enterprises
would make the distribution even more tail-heavy.
3.3 Township and Village Enterprises
Another interesting case in China is the rise and fall of township and village
enterprises. Generally, township and village enterprises are firms ran in the
town or village by the local government; they contributed significantly to
China’s reform at the early stage. Emerging at the end of the 1970s, they
grew very fast. The industrial output of township and village enterprises
grew at 38.2% annually in the period from 1982 to 1988; the number of
employees in those enterprises grew from 28 Million in 1978 to a peak of
135 Million in 1996. But due to the following reforms, the private economy
was growing much faster after 1992, most township and village enterprises
were bankrupted and only a minority was privatized. For example, alone
in 1995 nearly 3 Million township and village enterprises were bankrupted.
Therefore, this sort of historical breaking point might have led to significant
changes in the distribution of size, number, and age of firms. Most crucially,
if the power-law distribution in firm sizes is assumed to be the result of
self-organization processes, the time at which this vast restructuring took
place may have affected the speed with which the distribution converges to
the power law, as well as, more directly, relocalization decisions of certain
firms, bankruptcy and startup-establishment rates, and thus perhaps also
the dispersion of firm sizes within the distribution and the parameters of the
power law as suggested in section 5.
The reforms of state-owned enterprises and township and village enterprises
may also provide an explanation why the average firms in Eastern provinces
are younger than their Western and Central counterparts. In the Eastern
provinces, township and village enterprises have even been developed very
well and private economy is very active, hence, we can assume the birth/death
rate of firms in those provinces to be higher than that of other regions.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Method
We use the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database for the years between
1998 and 2008. The database contains data on between approximately
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160000 (1998) and 410000 (2008) firms in the People’s Republic of China.6
The firm size distribution is studied using three different measures, 1) the
number of employees, 3) capital (specifically paid-in capital7), 3) gross profit
as they are included in the database.8 Further, we study the firm age distri-
bution (which we suspect not to be power law distributed). The distributions
are evaluated by year and by province.
The power law distribution is fitted using the well-established method laid
out in detail in Clauset et al. (2009) or Maschberger and Kroupa (2009). That
is, the minimum value and the exponent of the power law are fitted simulta-
neously, assigning each candidate minimum value a maximum likelihood ex-
ponent and choosing the exponent that minimizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic (distance of empirical and fitted CDF). The standard error of the
exponents is the bootstrapped from samples of 500 artificial distributions
with the fitted parameters. The goodness of fit of the estimates is evaluated
using the KS test for plausibility and Vuong’s test (log-likelihood ratio with
Gaussian error < 0.1) for comparisons with fits to alternative distribution
types (lognormal and exponential).
4.2 Results
The firm size distribution in terms of capital for the entire country is shown
for 2008 (as an example) in figures 1 (PDF) and 2 (complementary CDF);
that in terms of numbers of employees is shown in figures 3 (PDF) and
4.9 The power law form is visually plausible. Further we show the firm
size distribution for all three measures (number of employees, capital, gross
profits) for Shanghai as an example in figures 5, 6, 7 and for comparison
the distribution of firm ages in figure 8 (all figures complementary CDFs for
2008). It is clear that the power law is much less plausible for the firm age10
while the shapes of the other distributions are fairly close to each other.
Not all the fits for all provinces and all years were plausible - some were
rejected by either the KS-test or Vuong’s test (vs. lognormal or exponen-
6Only firms with revenue > 1000 Yuan are included, which does, however, not have an
impact on the present study, as we only estimate the power law exponents of the tail of
the distribution (i.e. large firms).
7This includes share capital as well as additional revenue from shares sold in excess of
par.
8The number of employees is given as ”从业人数” (number of employees), ”全部职工”
(all employees) etc. for different years; capital as ”实收资本” (paid in capital), and gross
profits as ”利润总额” (total profit). The firm age is computed from founding year and
month (”开工时间（年）”, ”开工时间（月）”) as given in the database.
9We do not show the figures for the firm size distribution in terms of gross profits; it is
almost identical to that in terms of capital.
10It turned out to be statistically plausible for Shanghai for some years, but this does
not hold for any of the other provinces.
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Figure 1: Firm size (measured in capital) distribution, China, 2008
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Figure 2: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm size (measured in capital) distribution, China, 2008
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Figure 3: Firm size (measured in numbers of employees) distribution, China,
2008
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Figure 4: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm size (measured in numbers of employees) distribution,
China, 2008
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Figure 5: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm size (measured in capital) distribution, Shanghai, 2008
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Figure 6: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm size (measured in numbers of employees) distribution,
Shanghai, 2008
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Figure 7: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm size (measured in gross profits) distribution, Shanghai,
2008
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Figure 8: Survival function (complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion) for the firm age distribution, Shanghai, 2008
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Figure 9: Development of power law exponents for firm size in terms of
capital, gross profits, and number of employees for Shanghai, 1998-2008,
significant values only (KS test with 10% threshold and log-likelihood ratio
vs. lognormal and exponential fit).
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Figure 10: Power law exponents for firm size measured in capital, by province,
1998, values as in table 2.
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Figure 11: Power law exponents for firm size measured in capital, by province,
2008, values as in table 2.
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Figure 12: Power law exponents for firm size measured in number of employ-
ees, by province, 1998, values as in table 2.
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Figure 13: Power law exponents for firm size measured in number of employ-
ees, by province, 2008, values as in table 2.
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Figure 14: Annual growth 1998 by province.
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Figure 15: Annual growth 2008 by province.
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Figure 16: Median age of firms 2008 by province.
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Region α (#Emp. 1998) KS p α (#Emp. 2008) KS p α (Cap. 1998) KS p α (Cap. 2008) KS p
Inner Mongolia 2.087±0.062 0.3263 2.248±0.041 0.1763 1.933±0.07512 0.3043 1.853±0.0411 0.0334
Shanxi 2.149±0.038 0.253 2.152±0.033 0.1283 1.903±0.027 0.2563 2.0±0.0581 0.1643
Hebei 2.317±0.043 0.3563 2.323±0.051 0.4683 2.014±0.043 0.6243 2.009±0.0421 0.1923
Beijing 2.337±0.0611 0.23 2.301±0.047 0.883 2.119±0.074 0.453 2.068±0.0781 0.1223
Liaoning 2.227±0.0481 0.4183 2.226±0.0431 0.4623 1.941±0.0371 0.4483 1.95±0.0481 0.4743
Jilin 2.14±0.068 0.653 2.056±0.0781 0.1483 2.046±0.0841 0.423
Heilongjiang 2.074±0.0351 0.4923 1.927±0.045 0.143 2.043±0.098 0.3623
Shanghai 2.481±0.047 0.5783 2.583±0.0521 0.2343 2.165±0.0531 0.2683 2.118±0.037 0.6423
Jiangsu 2.803±0.0841 0.2443 2.416±0.0871 0.0434 2.411±0.051 0.2663
Anhui 2.606±0.083 0.113 2.345±0.046 0.2823 1.931±0.034 0.363 1.981±0.065 0.223
Shandong 2.581±0.074 0.3043 2.308±0.063 0.1643 2.236±0.05 0.1483
Tianjin 2.587±0.091 0.2563 2.281±0.0451 0.1083 2.144±0.0711 0.143 2.104±0.046 0.0323
Zhejiang 3.003±0.093 0.3663 2.857±0.055 0.4223 2.39±0.1161 0.3883 2.441±0.0531 0.1863
Jiangxi 2.656±0.111 0.3063 2.458±0.0831 0.733 2.066±0.089 0.6343 2.136±0.0841 0.143
Fujian 2.222±0.054 0.1523 2.353±0.104 0.4263
Chongqing 2.495±0.099 0.8083 2.391±0.0711 0.6963 2.11±0.074 0.183 2.153±0.079 0.23
Hunan 2.584±0.112 0.5163 2.408±0.0561 0.513 1.947±0.032 0.07434 2.145±0.08 0.4583
Hubei 2.55±0.091 0.2843 2.516±0.073 0.183 2.169±0.081 0.5063 2.042±0.0621 0.1443
Henan 2.465±0.054 0.173 2.286±0.0351 0.3183 2.033±0.04 0.3763 2.072±0.044 0.2063
Guangdong 2.819±0.068 0.06834 2.636±0.048 0.04434 2.671±0.11 0.523 2.39±0.051 0.1143
Guangxi 2.63±0.101 0.5463 2.725±0.1431 0.4323 2.206±0.06 0.123 2.187±0.091 0.1443
Guizhou 2.482±0.164 0.5663 2.379±0.057 0.2063 2.134±0.1041 0.5763 1.837±0.0321 0.1863
Hainan 3.271±0.3231 0.598 2.731±0.1781 0.3263 2.285±0.148 0.2463 1.864±0.0791 0.2063
Sichuan 2.586±0.108 0.13 2.466±0.051 0.3043 2.36±0.0891 0.1463 2.17±0.051 0.3043
Yunnan 2.399±0.078 0.2383 2.6±0.078 0.4163 2.017±0.053 0.5543 1.891±0.0351 0.03834
Shaanxi 2.496±0.125 0.2363 2.079±0.032 0.7083 2.182±0.0871 0.1463 1.939±0.0441 0.2443
Gansu 2.104±0.0541 0.5363 2.259±0.059 0.2543 1.811±0.042 0.2143 1.846±0.037 0.1263
Ningxia 2.137±0.084 0.4423 2.06±0.063 0.2923 1.748±0.0561 0.4583 1.805±0.05512 0.5883
Qinghai 2.337±0.17 0.514 2.127±0.134 0.5023 1.869±0.071 0.4123 1.931±0.121 0.5023
Xinjiang 2.391±0.1171 0.2263 2.213±0.101 0.3223 2.025±0.074 0.253 1.868±0.069 0.4823
Table 2: Fitted power law exponents and KS p-value for firm size measured
by capital and number of employees, by province, 1998 and 2008. Significant
fits only (KS-test and log-likelihood ratio vs. lognormal and exponential
fits); for some values not significant fits were replaced with significant fits
of successive or previous years (1999 or 2000 instead of 1998; 2006 or 2007
instead of 2008, indicated by superscript 1); for some values not significant
fits for capital were replaced for significant fits for gross profits (indicated
by superscript 2); fits significantly superior to exponential fits (log-likelihood
ratio) are indicated by superscript 3; fits that fail to achieve the 10% level of
the KS p-value but still have a KS p-value > 2.5%, thus significant with a
higher error probability, are indicated by superscript 4.
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tial).11 Plausible fits were mostly stable in time (figure 9 shows the time
development for Shanghai). The exponents for the firm size distribution in
terms of the number of employees were found to be somewhat higher than
that for gross profits or capital in the great majority of cases. The exponents
for the firm size distributions in terms of capital and gross profits were found
to be generally very close to one another (with sometimes the exponent for
the gross profits being slightly lower than that for capital). These empirical
findings as well as the numeric estimates (some of which are given in table
2) are in good agreement with the literature as discussed above (Zhang et al.
(2009), Fujimoto et al. (2011), Gaffeo et al. (2003)).
Exponents for the early (1998) and the late part (2008) of the sample are
given for all provinces in table 2 for the firm size distribution measured in
number of employees and in capital. Rejected fits have, where possible, been
exchanged for either better fits in the immediately succeeding or preceding
years (1999 or 2000 for 1998 and 2006 or 2007 for 2008); where this was not
feasible, we have attempted to replace rejected fits for capital by fits for gross
profits (since the exponent for these measures were almost always very close).
There are a few instances where even so, we could not give any plausible fits
or approximations from succeeding/preceding years (missing values in the
table).12
We study the correlations of the so obtained samples of exponents (for
provinces) with GDP growth in 1998 and in 200813 as well as with the av-
erage firm age in 2008. Moderately good correlations are obtained between
growth 1998 and the capital exponents 1998 (0.488, p-value< 0.01), growth
1998 and the capital exponents 2008 (0.635, p < 0.001), growth 1998 and the
numbers of employees exponents 2008 (0.321, p < 0.1), as well as between
growth 2008 and the capital exponents 2008 (0.31, p < 0.1), and between the
median firm age 2008 and the capital exponents 1998 (-0.533, p < 0.01) and
2008 (-0.531, p < 0.01) as well as median firm age 2008 and the number of
employees exponents 1998 (-0.345, p < 0.1) and 2008 (-0.326, p < 0.1). The
exponents are all positively correlated among themselves, p < 0.01.
The geographic distribution is illustrated in figures 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
and 16. That the exponents are closely related can most clearly be seen from
the Eastern and Southern coastal areas between Guangdong, Shanghai, and
Tianjin. From figures 13, 14, and 15, it can also be seen that there is a
connection between exponents on the one hand and both GDP growth and
firm age on the other hand (as indicated in the correlation coefficients above).
11Most fits were significantly better than the exponential fit; comparisons with lognormal
were mostly inconclusive; see table 2.
12For Tibet, the sample size was too small to obtain reasonably good estimates.
13Data from China Statistical Yearbooks from the National Bureau of Statistics in
China, http://www.stats.gov.cn.
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5 Discussion of Results
In the light of the recent economic development in China as detailed in section
3, it is likely that it also had a strong effect on the firm size distribution. As
mentioned, the first regions where the transition to a more open market
economy was implemented were the coastal regions, the very regions that
also visibly stand out in the pattern of power law exponents estimated in
section 4 (see figures 10 through 13). Power law exponents were higher in
these regions, indicating 1. a steeper tail distribution with less weight on
extreme tail events (super-large firms in this case), 2. a smaller dispersion,
smaller skewness, etc., and, if the distribution indeed obeys a power law, 3.
the finiteness of the mean of the distribution.14 This result is not intuitive as
it is precisely the coastal region where some of the most dynamic industrial
clusters, the financial centers, and the headquarters of some of the largest
firms are located which would suggest a particularly large dispersion and
high share of tail observations (i.e. small exponents). However, the rest of
the distribution seems to adjust in a way that does not only counterbalance
this but tilts the exponent into the other (higher) direction.
Potential consequences of different exponents include a relatively higher con-
fidence in handling the tail of the distribution. In particular, the distribution
financial risk associated with individual bankruptcies (i.e. not taking into ac-
count ownership and lending interconnections, resulting potential bankruptcy
cascades and systemic risk15) will follow the same distribution if there is no
additional connection between firm size and likelihood of bankruptcy. In
this case, higher exponents will increase the predictability and, by extension,
controllability of disastrous bankruptcies and probably (depending on the
structure of the ownership and lending network) also that of systemic risk.16
The nature of the distribution as a power law as such indicates that the
shape of the distribution is likely invariant to scaling including aggregation
and disaggregation as long as these operations remain unbiased.17
14The ith moment of power law distributions with exponent α exists (is finite) if and
only if i ≤ α−1. Consequently, the mean exists for most of the cases observed in our study
(different from some findings reported in the literature, see table 1), those with α ≥ 2,
while the variance and higher moments are almost never finite. If the distribution was
not a power law (we found no clear dominance between power law and lognormal fits for
instance), this would be different.
15The distribution resulting from this would be more skewed with even higher likelihood
of tail events.
16This argument is particularly valid for the firm size measured in pay-in capital and
perhaps gross profit (since it may indicate a higher capacity to react to liquidity problems),
less so for the number of employees.
17As mentioned above, the failure to maintain the power law under sectoral disaggre-
gation in some studies has cast doubt on the nature of the distribution; it is, however,
possible that sectoral disaggregation is not always unbiased while regional disaggregation
apparently is (at least for the scales we study).
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However, the question of the origin of the power law shape remains unan-
swered as does the related question for the reason for the systematic differ-
ences in exponents found across regions.
As seen in figures 14 through 16, the Eastern coastal regions (that tend to
have higher exponents) also differ markedly from Central and Western China
in terms of growth rates and firm age, which suggests a possible connection,
e.g. that the effect of economic development on the firm size distribution
might be mediated by either growth or firm age or both.
Both of these effects are theoretically possible (as are many others) and can
be modeled.
First, higher exponents may result from comparatively higher growth in the
small and medium sized firms (low and middle part of the distribution) while
the distribution maintains the characteristic overall shape as a result of one of
the mechanisms discussed in section 2. The reason for such a process may lie
in direct stimulation of growth in smaller firms, in better R&D performance
of smaller firms, in the removal of market entry barriers, or in greater ease of
doing business for smaller enterprises and startups. Any or all of these may
be associated with the transformation to the market economy. Consider as
a simple computational example a growth process satisfying this setting
y = g(x) = k h
√
x
(with h > 1 and k sufficiently large that E(y) > E(x)) acting on power law
distributed firm sizes
p(x) = Cx−α.
The resulting distribution is
p(y) =
dg−1
dy
p(g−1) = Chkh(1−α)y−αh−1+h = C˜y−αh−1+h
where C˜ = Chkh(1−α) is the new constant and the new exponent is larger
than the old one αh+ 1− h > α, see A.
Second, the reforms led to breakups (even bankruptcies) of some of the large
state-owned enterprises which may have eliminated a part of the tail of the
distribution18 with smaller firms reacting to this thereby restoring the distri-
bution’s power law shape.
Third, if the origin of the power law distribution is indeed the Gibrat process
(or the Kesten process), the distribution should yield an exponent α = 2.
However, the distribution may be subject to disturbances, perhaps caused
by growth processes as suggested above, which temporarily create different
18This is in line with the assessment of the changes in the productivity distribution as
given by Yu et al. (2015).
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slopes of the power law (i.e., different exponents) before reverting to the
Gibrat exponent. Regions currently or recently in transition may experience
stronger disturbances and perhaps also disturbances that systematically work
into the same direction. (This would also offer an explanation why all devi-
ations from the Gibrat exponent observed for China were upward while the
literature provides numerous examples of deviations in both directions for
other countries.)
Fourth, regions that experience higher growth may result in systematically
different exponents as a result of more rapid technological progress, or of dif-
ferent distributions of productivity, firm age, or product diversity (following
the models by Zhang et al. (2009), Helpman et al. (2004), Coad (2010), and
Buldyrev et al. (2007) respectively).
Fifth, following preferential attachment models of firm size development
Dahui et al. (2006), Stephen and Toubia (2009), the reforms may have led
to the establishment of new connections, especially by and between smaller
firms.
Sixth, the large shifts in the ownership structure associated with market
reforms may have had an impact on the size distribution, especially since
it is reported (though for more recent years) that dynamic characteristics
of Chinese firms are strongly dependent on the ownership structure (Duschl
and Peng (2015)).
Finally, firm ages, which were shown to be inversely related to higher power
law exponents (steeper firm size distributions). They may have a direct
effect (as in Coad (2010)) or may themselves be a result of a quantity that
influences the firm ages, such as bankruptcy (which would also be in line with
large numbers of township and village enterprises but also of state-owned
enterprises that were disestablished in connection with the market reforms).
A model of a firm-age mediated effect on the firm size distribution resulting
in both a power law and a specific variation of the exponents between the
regions as observed empirically could employ the Yule process. An instance
of preferential attachment, the Yule process is known to yield power law
distributions with exponent α = 2 (Newman (2005)). The Yule process
starts with a single node and proceeds to add ’children nodes’ to randomly
(with equal probabilities) selected nodes. The distribution of the number of
children follows a power law with α = 2. It can be modeled as a Markov chain
with steady state conditions (following Newman (2005), with p(b) being the
frequency of nodes with b children, n the total number of nodes)
(n+ 1)p(1) = np(1)− p(1) + 1
(n+ 1)p(b) = np(b)− bp(b) + (b− 1)p(b− 1)
It follows p(1) = 1/2 and (where ∼ gives the approximation for the tail, i.e.
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for large b)
p(b) = b−1
b+1
p(b− 1) = 2(b−1)!
(b+1)!
p(1) = 2(b−1)!
(b−1)!b(b+1)p(1)
= 2
b2+b
p(1) = 2
b2+b
∼ b−2.
Consider a (very simple, stylized) model of increasing returns: Every firm es-
tablishes its own technology. Other, smaller, firms can adopt this technology
which causes the firm to grow. The smaller firms, in turn, will interconnect
their technology and the ’parent technology’, which means all adopters of
their technology will also adopt the ’parent technology’ causing the ’parent
firm’ to grow further. This is an instance of the Yule process and would
therefore create a power law with α = 2.
To introduce variations in the exponent, consider random bankruptcy of
firms. Assume firms that will bankrupt are chosen at random with an average
value of z for each firm added to the system by the above Yule process.
Further assume, these firms are immediately replaced by a firm of size 1.19
Consequently, the above Markov chain becomes
(n+ 1)p(1) = np(1)− p(1) + 1 + (1− z)p(1)
(n+ 1)p(b) = np(b)− bp(b) + (b− 1)p(b− 1)− zp(1)
which yields p(1) = 1/(1 + z) and
p(b) =
Γ(b)Γ(3 + z)
Γ(b+ 2 + z)
1
1 + z
which can, as shown in B, be developed into
p(b) = Cb−2−z.
That is, a bankruptcy rate z (at least for z < 1) will increase the exponent of
the resulting power law by order z which can be generalized as the relation
of death rate and birth rate. Note, however, that for real firm populations
it is likely that birth and death rate are correlated, both increasing as the
industry becomes more dynamic while rather static firm populations will
have low birth and low death rates. The relation of the two influences the
(median) firm age which could thus be used as a proxy. Figure 16 and the
correlation of median firm ages with the exponents as cited above underlines
this possible explanation.
19This ensures that the dynamic is not changed at the level of the total population and
that p(b) does not depend on p(b+ 1).
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6 Conclusion
In the present study, we estimated the power law distribution for firm sized
measured in terms of 1) the number of employees, 2) capital, 3) gross profit
for the provinces of China for the years 1998 through 2008. The case of
mainland China is unique for its stepwise transition to market economy in
the 1980s and 1990s; this makes it an example that is worth studying not
just in order to understand the firm size distribution in China or to prove yet
again that firm sizes are indeed power law distributed, but also in order to
investigate the effects behind the emergence of this distribution in virtually
every case that was studied. Many scholars (Bak et al. (1988), Mandelbrot
and Hudson (2004)) have hypothesized that scale free distribution in itself
represents some kind of self-organization; that it indicates a process driven to
converge against a distribution by a critical transition or otherwise; a process
that likely results from evolutionary mechanisms in the underlying system.
In general agreement with the literature, we found exponents (validated with
the KS test and Vuoung’s test) concentrated between 2.0 and 2.5 (with some
few outliers) for the firm size distribution measured in terms of capital and
gross profits and slightly higher for the firms size measured in the number of
employees. As exponents reported in the literature range from 1.4 to 3.7, it
would appear that the less steep part, the lower range of exponents (which
ever of the expoanations put forward in section 5 holds) is missing in China.
Comparing the estimated exponents for different regions, a very clear geo-
graphical picture emerges. For the Eastern coastal regions, the estimated
exponents tend to be higher with moderate levels in the Central part and
rather low levels in the Western regions of the country. The same pattern
can be recovered from the pattern of GDP growth across the provinces (with
the exception of very high growth Inner Mongolia which is, however, mainly
resource based). The pattern of median firm ages in 2008 on the other hand
allows a very clear illustration of the regional stages of China’s economic
reforms: Eastern coastal regions (moderate to high firm ages) first, Cen-
tral provinces (very low firm ages) second (then recent), Western regions
afterwards. Higher power law exponents indicate smaller dispersion and a
lower distribution mass on extreme tail observations; finding the highest ex-
ponents in precisely the economic centers of the country where the largest
firms concentrate is therefore not an immediately intuitive but still very sig-
nificant result. It hints at other effects that balance this and at the role of
a mechanism that appears to stabilize the distribution in spite of changing
determinants.
Potential explanations put forward in the section 5 in turn connect the ob-
served patterns to more rapid growth of smaller and medium sized firms as a
result of the reforms on the one hand and to bankruptcy patterns on the other
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hand. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; other ex-
planations, involving changes in the ownership structure (away from absolute
dominance of state-owned firms), product diversity, or firm age distribution,
are conceivable as well.
Of course, any or all of these possible explanations may be connected to the
patterns observed in section 4. Independent from the explanation, however,
some stylized facts could be established: the firm size distribution in China
likely follows a power law with slightly higher exponents than reported for
other countries. This continues to hold in the regional firm size distributions
where the parameters differ systematically and appear to be connected to
growth and firm age.
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A Derivation of the transformation y = k h
√
x
on the power law distribution
PDFs resulting from continuous invertible transformations y = g(x) on con-
tinuous random variables x are given as
p(y) =
dg−1
dy
p(g−1)
Hence, the transformation y = g(x) = k h
√
x = kx1/h (with h > 1 and k >> 0)
on p(x) = Cx−α yields
g−1(y) =
(y
k
)h
dg−1
dy
= hk−hyh−1
p(y) =
dg−1
dy
p(g−1) = hk−hyh−1Ckαhy−αh = Chkh(1−α)y−αh−1+h = C˜y−αh−1+h
where C˜ = Chkh(1−α) is the net constant and the new exponent is larger
than the old one (if α > 1) since
αh+ 1− h > α
αh− α = α(h− 1) > h− 1
α > 1.
B Approximation of the distribution p(b, z) of
the modified Yule process
The Markov chain
(n+ 1)p(1) = np(1)− p(1) + 1 + (1− z)p(1)
(n+ 1)p(b) = np(b)− bp(b) + (b− 1)p(b− 1)− zp(1)
yields p(1) = 1/(1 + z) and
p(b) = b−1
b+1+z
p(b− 1) = Γ(b−1+1)Γ(2+z+1)
Γ(b+1+z+1)
p(1) = Γ(b)Γ(3+z)
Γ(b+2+z)
p(1)
= Γ(b)Γ(3+z)
Γ(b+2+z)
1
1+z
Note that we have to use the Gamma function (which is the continuous exten-
sion of the factorial with n! = Γ(n+1)) since the factorial is not defined over
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non-integer values. The Markov chain is unfortunately not as conveniently
solved as the one above. However, using Stirling’s approximation (Dutkay
et al. (2012))
m! = Γ(m+ 1) ≈
√
2pimm+0.5e−m =
√
2pim
(m
e
)m
,
we obtain (∼ again giving the approximation of the tail, i.e. for large b)
p(b) ≈
√
2pi(b− 1) ( b−1
e
)b−1√
2pi(2 + z)
(
2+z
e
)2+z√
2pi(b+ 1 + z)
(
b+1+z
e
)b+1+z 11 + z
p(b) =
√
2pi
(b+ 1)(2 + z)
b+ 1 + z
(
2 + z
e
)2+z
e−2−z
1
1 + z
(b− 1)b−1
(b+ 1 + z)b+1+z
p(b) = C
(b− 1)b−1
(b+ 1 + z)b+1+z
∼ Cb(b−1)−(b+1+z) = Cb−2−z.
That is, a bankruptcy rate z (at least for z < 1) will increase the exponent
of the resulting power law by order z. To illustrate this, a simulation of
this system for different z is added in figure 17. Note that z may be seen
as a death rate in the resulting process that is contrasted to a birth rate 1
(the velocity of the Yule process itself, the speed at which new nodes are
added, 1 per iteration). The resulting property can thus be generalized as
death rate / birth rate = z / 1 = z.
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Figure 17: Exponent estimated for Yule processes with random exit (death
rate); averages over 100 simulations for each death/birth rate.
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